State v. Harden: Muddying the Waters of Self-Defense Law in West Virginia by Daines, Devin C.
Volume 113 Issue 3 Article 9 
April 2011 
State v. Harden: Muddying the Waters of Self-Defense Law in 
West Virginia 
Devin C. Daines 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Devin C. Daines, State v. Harden: Muddying the Waters of Self-Defense Law in West Virginia, 113 W. Va. L. 
Rev. (2011). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/9 
This Student Work is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
STATE V HARDEN: MUDDYING THE WATERS OF
SELF-DEFENSE LAW IN WEST VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 971
II. THE UNDISPUTED, UNCORROBORATED, AND IGNORED FACTS...........977
A. A "Night of Domestic Terror:" The Undisputed Facts of State
v. Harden ............................... .....977
B. Tanya's Version-and the Court's Endorsement of That
Version-of Events Immediately Before the Shooting............978
C. Expert Testimony Suggested That Danuel was Unarmed,
Unconscious, and Shot in the Head at Close Range .............. 980
III. DROPPING THE PROCEDURAL BALL ..............................982
A. Giving Lip Service to the Standard ofReview ..... ...... 982
B. Usurping the Fact-Finding Role of the Jury ................ 983
C. Misapprehending the Law vs. Misapprehending the Evidence:
Distinguishing State v. Hardenfrom State v. Cook................985
1. Evidentiary Distinctions Between Harden and Cook ..... 987
2. Legal and Procedural Distinctions Between Harden and
Cook ......................... .............. 989
IV. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY LAW .................... 991
A. Reconciling Reasonableness, Imminent Danger, and Previous
Apprehensions of Danger: Ridding Jury Instructions of
McMilion Confusion ...................... 991
B. New Syllabus Point 4: Negating Necessary Elements of the
Offenses Charged, Despite a Lack of Evidence of
Self-Defense? ........................... ...... 993
C. Moving from the Minority to the Majority: Eliminating the Duty




That domestic violence in general and the abuse of women in particular
are serious problems in West Virginia would be a dramatic understatement.
Victims and witnesses of domestic violence are permanently scarred, both phys-
ically and emotionally. Lives are destroyed and the collateral damage done to
families is incalculable. The calculable statistics are staggering and tragic. In
2008 alone, over 13,500 incidents of domestic violence were reported to West
Virginia law enforcement and seventy-five percent of those incidents involved
1
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female victims.' Domestic violence cost thirty-two people their lives.2 Of the
13,500 plus reported incidents, over 8,300 involved either a current, estranged,
or former spouse or an intimate partner. Worse yet, these figures only
represent the number of reported incidents of domestic violence, meaning that
the true figures are much higher.4
The West Virginia Legislature has taken notice of this crisis, finding
that "[d]omestic violence is a major health and law enforcement problem in this
State with enormous costs to the State in both dollars and human lives. Domes-
tic violence can be deterred, prevented or reduced by legal intervention that
treats this problem with the seriousness that it deserves."5 While improvements
to the overall prevention, treatment, education, and public awareness of domes-
tic violence are recognized, many commentators have argued that these legisla-
tive and legal remedies do not go far enough in protecting all women 6 from their
abusive partners.7 This problem presents difficult legal issues when battered
women resort to deadly force and then argue self-defense at trial, particularly
where the evidence suggests that their assailants were sleeping or otherwise
incapacitated.8 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was recently con-
fronted with a case set in this unfortunate factual context which presented these
I See W. VA. STATE POLICE, CRIME IN WEST VIRGINIA 2008, at 675, 685 (37th ed. 2008),
available at http://www.wvstatepolice.com/ucr/2008wvcrimes.pdf.
2 Id. at 683. The categories include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, and negligent man-
slaughter. Ten males and twenty two females were killed.
3 Id. at 677.
4 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 891-92
(1992) (citing American Medical Association research which indicates that domestic violence
figures are "'marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women
from reporting them," and that "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of
partner violence is probably double the above estimates").
5 W. VA. CODE § 48-27-101(a)(3), (4) (2010). Closely pertinent to this Note, the West Vir-
ginia Legislature also specifically recognized that "[c]hildren are often physically assaulted or
witness violence against one of their parents or other family or household members, violence
which too often ultimately results in death." Id. § (a)(2).
6 This is not to say that men never need protection from abusive partners or are unaffected by
domestic violence. This statement merely reflects the reality that a strong majority of domestic
violence is perpetrated by males upon female victims, as was the situation in the case upon which
this Note comments.
7 See State v. Whittaker, 650 S.E.2d 216, 232-33 (W. Va. 2007) ("(W]e sympathize with the
plight in which Ms. Whittaker found herself after numerous attempts to seek help from law en-
forcement authorities were unsuccessful . . . . 'Simply put, our law enforcement/criminal justice
system utterly failed' Ms. Whittaker and J.W."); Jeffrey M. Shawver, Comment, Battered by Men,
Bruised by Injustice: The Plight of Women who Fight Back and the Need for a Battered Women
Defense in West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 1139, 1141 (2008).
8 While countless books, treatises, and articles have been written about the "battered woman
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difficult legal issues. It is this case, State v. Harden,9 upon which this Note
comments.
In order to better understand these legal issues, a brief overview of the
six elements of self-defense is in order. West Virginia, like most other states,
has used the common law to establish the necessary elements of self-defense.
First, the defendant must show that she was not the aggressor, and that she did
not provoke the attack.'0 Second, the defendant must show that she actually
believed she was in danger." Third, the defendant's belief must be objectively
reasonable, "which is to say that another person, similarly situated, could have
reasonably formed the same belief."' 2 Fourth, the risk of death or serious bodily
injury that the defendant faces must be imminent.' 3 Fifth, the defendant's ac-
tions of self-defense must be proportionate to the danger she faces.14 Finally, if
the defendant puts on sufficient evidence of these five elements, the burden then
shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
act in self-defense.15
One tough legal issue then, when an abused or battered woman kills her
husband, 6 is that the elements of self-defense evolved from a male-dominated
perspective. Therefore, this masculine self-defense paradigm does not apply
particularly well to the cases where a woman kills her usually bigger, stronger
husband.' 7 Another hotly-debated issue in this area of the law is whether, given
9 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 2009).
10 Id at 641 ("This requirement reflects the common law rule that 'one who is at fault or who
is the aggressor can not rely on self-defense."') (citing State v. Smith, 295 S.E.2d 820, 822 (W.
Va. 1982)).
" Id. at 635 ("[A] defendant [must] 'actually believe that [she] is in danger . ) (citing
State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127, 137 (W. Va. 1999)).
12 Id
13 Id. at 641 ("[T]he defendant [must] believe, that he or she was at 'imminent' risk of death or
serious bodily injury."). "Imminent" is defined as "ready to take place[,]" or "hanging threate-
ningly over one's head[.]" MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 535 (11th ed. 2006); see also
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 246-47 (4th ed. 2006) ("In the context of
self-defense, force is said to be 'imminent' if it will occur 'immediately,' or 'at the moment of...
danger.' The danger must be 'pressing and urgent . . . .' Indeed, even if it seems clear that the
harm at the hands of another is inevitable, use of force is premature until the threat is immediate.")
(citations omitted).
14 Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 641 (citing State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d 550, 554 (W. Va. 1981)).
'5 Id. (citing Syl. pt. 4, State v. Kirtley, 252 S.E.2d 374 (W.'Va. 1978)).
16 See supra note 6.
17 See CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 35, 41 (1989) ("The body of case law
that began very early to grow up about self-defense in the centuries following the Conquest in-
evitably reflected the male-centered point of view of a rigorously male-centered society ... . It
should begin to be clear why, when the courts two hundred years later began to try to apply self-
defense law to situations in which battered women killed their husbands, it was so hard to make
the law fit."); Kathleen Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives on Women's Human Rights and Strat-
egies for their Implementation, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 799, 813-14 (1996) ("[T]he traditional
common law self-defense [is] gender biased . . . . [T]he law's traditional concept of self-defense
9732011]
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the gender bias inherent in the self-defense requirements, courts should relax the
"imminent danger" requirement by replacing it with a "necessary" requirement
when battered women kill their abusers in non-confrontational situations, simi-
lar to the approach taken by the Model Penal Code.' 8
On the one hand, proponents for a more lenient "imminent danger" re-
quirement argue that a strict requirement wrongly deprives battered women the
opportunity to pre-empt an inevitable (as opposed to an imminent) attack.' 9
Without the ability to pre-empt a deadly attack, it is argued that women become
perpetually victimized and dominated by their bigger, stronger abusers and are
forced to roll the dice by risking their lives while waiting until the threat of
death is truly imminent before repelling the attack with deadly force.20 On the
evolved out of a 'bar-room brawl' model that comprehends only a male concept of reasonable-
ness.") (citations omitted); Dr. Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women as Defendants, in LEGAL
RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 235 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993)
("Historical precedent created a standard based on men defending themselves and their family
against other men. The problem has been to judge self-defense by a standard that included wom-
en's reasonable perception of danger, particularly when based upon years of suffering physical,
sexual, and psychological aggression."); see also Shana Wallace, Beyond Imminence: Evolving
International Law and Battered Women's Right to Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1749, 1753
(2004) ("Women's experiences with domestic violence were simply not envisioned when the legal
criteria for self-defense were developed. Rather, the doctrine of coverture allowed husbands to
discipline their wives physically, and women were specifically forbidden to defend themselves
against such abuse.").
18 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985) ("(1) ... the use of force upon or toward another person
is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself .... ) (emphasis added); see also id. § (2)(c) (". . . a person employing protec-
tive force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to be
when the force is used . . . .") (emphasis added); but cf Syl. pt. 8, State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679
(1882) ("In such a case as to the imminency of the danger, which threatened the prisoner, and the
necessity of the killing in the first instance the prisoner is the judge; but he acts at his peril, as the
jury must pass upon his action in the premises, viewing said actions from the prisoner's stand-
point at the time of the killing[.]") (emphasis added); DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 247 ("The
imminency requirement is controversial. Some scholars advocate its abolition on the ground that
'[i]f the concern is to exclude threats of harm that are too remote to require a response, the prob-
lem is adequately handled by requiring simply that the response be necessary."') (citing 2 PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 78 (1984)).
19 See Stephen J. Morse, The "New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome, " 14 CRIM. JUST. ETHIcs 1, 3,
12 (1995) ("If death or serious bodily harm in the relatively near future is a virtual certainty and
the future attack cannot be adequately defended against when it is imminent and if there are no
reasonable alternatives, traditional self-defense doctrine ought to justify the pre-emptive strike.")
20 See Judith E. Koons, Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate Battery and
Deadly Legal Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 617, 692 (2006) (Arguing that "as a consequence of the
. . . imminence doctrine[], the safety of many women who live with battering men is dis-
counted."); id. at 656-57 ("Battering . . . is distorted when read through doctrines such as immi-
nence . . .. Infused with suppositions about gender roles and behavior, imminence often functions
as a retreat rule to enforce unspoken societal assumptions that women should leave battering
relationships before episodes of violence take place."); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivi-
ty, 68 U. CHi. L. REv. 1235, 1300-01 (2001) ("[A] state that denies the opportunity for self-
defense, that asks its citizens to die rather than protect themselves, recreates the very same fears
that citizens will become the slavish victims of the strong.").
974 [Vol. 113
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other hand, those who argue that the strict imminent danger requirement should
be left intact say that this safeguard properly distinguishes retaliatory or pre-
emptive killings to redress a previous wrong from killings in true self-defense.
These commentators further argue that the absence of the imminent danger re-
quirement would give rise to lawlessness, and an increase of violent self-help
vigilantism.2 1 Commentators and courts also debate whether, from a moral
perspective, a habitual abuser has forfeited his rights to life and due process
even after the abuse ends, and whether courts should relax the legal standards
under which the abused can simultaneously act as the judge, jury, and execu-
ioner.22
While vast amounts of literature have been written debating these con-
troversial issues, settling the debate once and for all is not the goal of this Note.
The broad topic of the Battered Spouse Syndrome is also largely beside the
21 See Whitley R. P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman, 10 NEW
CRIM. L. R. 324, 364 (2007) ("[T]he very rationale for a bright-line rule ... in the case of violent
self-help is to minimize the room for the exercise of human judgment as to when and how much to
impose harm on others in order to protect oneself. Without it, people are likely to overestimate
future risks and to err in the direction of acting preemptively . . . ."); DRESSLER, supra note 13, at
248 ("The difficulty in reforming the law is that when one moves away from an imminency re-
quirement to something less ... the risks of error in predicting the future and in predicting wheth-
er options less extreme that deadly force . . . are greatly enhanced." Dressler continues, "The
benefit of the imminency requirement, or at least of a rule requiring that a threat be fairly close to
occurring, is that it reduces the risk of unnecessary deadly force."); State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d
628, 648 (W. Va. 2009) ("I also question how such a lessened self-defense standard, which may
be seen by some as condoning or even tacitly encouraging the use of self-help violence or vigi-
lantism in a domestic setting, can be seen as a positive advancement in our efforts to reduce do-
mestic violence.") (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting).
22 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 21 (N.C. 1989) (Martin, J., dissenting) (referring to an ab-
user who was killed by his wife while asleep, "By his barbaric conduct over the course of twenty
years, [he] reduced the quality of the defendant's life to such an abysmal state that, given the
opportunity to do so, the jury might well have found that she was justified in acting in self-defense
for the preservation of her tragic life."); Kaufman, supra note 21, at 369 ("[I]t is an essential ele-
ment of the rule of law [thlat each person-even batterers-have a right to due process of law,
especially when their lives are at stake."); but cf DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 264 (Even if the
controversial moral forfeiture doctrine is an otherwise acceptable principle, its application [in a
non-confrontational battered woman homicide scenario] is troubling. First, in the traditional self-
defense context, an aggressor only temporarily forfeits his right to life. If he withdraws from the
conflict . .. his right to protect himself is restored. In the case of the abuser, however, the implica-
tion is that the constancy of his immoral conduct renders his right to life nearly permanently for-
feited. He becomes fair game for killing day or night, awake or asleep, in ambush or otherwise.
Second, the logic of the forfeiture position is that the abuser is fair game for killing by anyone ...
. After all, if the abuser has no right to life, why should it matter who kills him? It is unlikely that
many people would want to take the forfeiture doctrine to its logical conclusion.); see also Allen
v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 555 (1893) ("When can a man slay another? When can he sit as a
judge passing on the law, and a jury passing upon the facts . . . and then go[] out as a marshal or
sheriff and executing that judgment, all at the same time, . . . determining the facts as judge, jury,
and executioner all at the same time? This is a mighty power in the hands of the citizen."). Ob-
viously, this same logic would apply to abusers of either sex.
2011] 975
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point, given that it was not argued at the State v. Harden trial or appeal. 2 3 Nev-
ertheless, this case did involve a homicide preceded by violent spousal abuse.
Indeed, as one commentator stated, "One reason the resulting cases are difficult
is that [battered women who kill] do not fit neatly into the categories of good
and evil drawn by the criminal law." 24 Professor Rosen elaborates: "American
courts and criminal justice officials have a difficult time dealing with these cas-
es because they often involve sympathetic defendants who . . . have no defense
if the law was strictly applied." 25 After identifying the domestic violence prob-
lem plaguing West Virginia, and framing these tough legal questions, require-
ments and issues beforehand, the reader is hopefully provided with a helpful
introduction and background from which a meaningful analysis of State v. Har-
den26 is possible.
The ruling of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ("the
Court") in State v. Harden will certainly affect all future self-defense trials in
the state, but the ruling's impact will be especially significant when the case
involves a homicide preceded by domestic violence. This Note will comment
on this controversial decision and is organized as follows: Part II will provide
factual background to the case for context; Part III will examine how the Court
mishandled the case procedurally; and Part IV will outline the substantive addi-
tions and subtractions to West Virginia self-defense law. Deserved praise and
sharp criticisms will be offered throughout the Note. To be more specific, the
Note critiques how-instead of confronting these difficult issues mentioned
above head-on, or deferring to the West Virginia Legislature to wrestle with the
difficult public policy implications-the Court forced the square peg into the
round hole by pretending that the evidence fit the traditional self-defense re-
quirements perfectly while completely ignoring much of the State's compelling
expert testimony. Despite citing appropriate, binding standards of review, the
Court failed to adhere to them. And although the Court created new law (some
good, some bad, some painfully unclear) and overturned a lot of old, confusing
precedent, the Court made its own findings of fact and denied a retrial consistent
23 The Battered Woman Defense was not raised, nor was evidence of Battered Woman Syn-
drome put on by defense counsel at Tanya Harden's trial. Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 649 (Benjamin,
C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing the case from a case cited by the majority, "However, Wyatt con-
cerned the Battered Spouse Syndrome which was not raised by the defendant at trial and was not
supported by the evidence."); see also Brief of Appellee at 2, State v. Harden, No. 34268 (W. Va.
Dec. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Brief of Appellee] ("The couple had been married for eleven years.
Although Mr. Harden had been verbally abusive in the past, the Appellant conceded that she had
never seen her husband this violent. Nor did she claim that he had a violent temper. She attri-
buted his behavior to his drinking which allegedly began earlier that day.").
24 Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf
ofBattered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 11, 13 (1986).
25 Id. Harden certainly involves a sympathetic defendant.
26 679 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 2009).
976 [Vol. 113
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with the new law it created. It ordered an immediate judgment of acquittal and
release of Mrs. Harden instead.2 7
II. THE UNDISPUTED, UNCORROBORATED, AND IGNORED FACTS
A. A "Night ofDomestic Terror:" The Undisputed Facts of State v. Har-
den
On the evening of September 5, 2004, Tanya Harden was arrested after
admitting that she shot and killed her husband, Danuel, with a shotgun.28 How-
ever, she first told her children, Danuel's parents, and the first law enforcement
officer to arrive on the scene that Danuel had committed suicide, and then con-
tended that he violently beat her in a drunken rage and left her no choice but to
shoot him in self-defense. 29 Her murder trial began in March of 2007.30
The events leading up to the shooting were truly disturbing. Like so
many other tragedies, this one had its beginnings with Danuel's heavy drink-
ing.3' At the time of his death, Danuel's blood alcohol content measured at
0.22%, nearly three times the legal limit in West Virginia.32 As the night wore
on, Danuel became increasingly verbally and physically aggressive, subjecting
Tanya to a "knock-down-drag-out" beating, as the State described, that lasted
for several hours. 33  In its closing argument, the prosecution conceded that
Tanya had suffered "a night of domestic terror."34
Tanya received brutal injuries during this extreme violence. The treat-
ing physician at the emergency room testified that Tanya had been "struck . . .
about the head and back with the butt of a gun and [had been] threatened . . .
with the gun."35 The doctor further testified that "she was struck with a fist[,]"
that "she had contusions of both orbital areas, the right upper arm, a puncture
wound with a foreign body of the right forearm, contusions of her chest, left
facial cheek, the left upper lip[,]" and that "X-rays done at the time demonstrat-
ed a nasal fracture."3 6
27 Id. at 647. This result "shocked" even Mrs. Harden's appellate counsel, Russell Cook, who
admitted that he was hoping for, at best, a new trial. Mr. Cook spoke at a Women's Law Caucus
panel discussion regarding State v. Harden at the West Virginia University College of Law during
the spring semester, 2010.
28 Id. at 631.
29 Brief of Appellee, supra note 23, at 2-4 (citing Transcript of Record at 230, 290, 307, 478-
95).
3o Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 643 n. 11.
31 Id. at 632.
32 Id. at 644. The legal limit in West Virginia is 0.08%. Id.
3 Id. at 632.
34 Id
3 Id at 643.
36 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 643 (W. Va. 2009).
2011]1 977
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Photographs consistent with the doctor's findings were introduced,
showing two large black eyes, a battered and swollen nose, bruised lips, and
multiple bruises on her chest, arms, and legs." In addition to the physical beat-
ing she endured, the State also acknowledged that Danuel sexually abused
Tanya.
Even more heartbreaking is that the Harden's two children and one of
their friends were in the house that night for a sleepover.39 The daughter and her
friend testified that, although they were in the daughter's bedroom, they were
frightened and were repeatedly awakened by the arguing and fighting in the
living room. At one point, the girls saw Tanya's black eyes when she came into
the room to tell them to go to sleep.40
The State did not dispute any of the evidence described thus far, but ar-
gued that notwithstanding the intense and prolonged physical and sexual abuse
Tanya sustained at Danuel's hands, there was evidence suggesting that Tanya
pulled the trigger during a "cooling off' period while Danuel was lying on the
couch either sleeping, or passed out. 4 1 Such evidence would be legally signifi-
cant because, as the Court acknowledged, one of the required elements of self-
defense is that the defendant had to believe that "she was at 'imminent' risk of
death or serious bodily injury. 42  Tanya's testimony contradicted the State's
evidence on this issue. Thus, the jury had to weigh the conflicting evidence of
the existing circumstances at the time of Danuel's death.
B. Tanya's Version-and the Court's Endorsement of That Version-of
Events Immediately Before the Shooting
Tanya testified that her husband repeatedly threatened to kill her, and
that she saw "a change in him, and. . . knew it was going to happen." 3 In addi-
tion, Tanya testified that Danuel threatened the children, telling her that "[they]
wouldn't live[,]" and he "put the shotgun to [her] son's head and said he was
going to kill him."" Tanya testified that she then had to distract Danuel so that
n Id. at 643-44.
38 Id. at 632; see also id. at 644.
Id. at 642.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 634. The specific evidence that would further the State's theory of a "cooling off'
period will be specifically discussed in Part II.C., infra.
42 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 641 (W. Va. 2009) (emphasis added); see also id. ("[T]he
elements of our self-defense doctrine as follows: '[A] defendant who is not the aggressor and has
reasonable grounds to believe, and actually does believe, that he is in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm from which he could save himself only by using deadly force against his
assailant has the right to employ deadly force in order to defend himself."') (quoting State v.
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he would leave their son alone and go back to beating her.4 5 After being sexual-
ly assaulted, Tanya testified that Danuel "started taunting her, daring her to
shoot him or that he would shoot her, and that it was at this point she got the
decedent's shotgun and shot him.'" 6 Tanya further testified that "I thought I
was going to die. I knew I was," and that Danuel "would have killed [the child-
ren], too. . . .'
The opinion does not recount further testimony from Tanya regarding
the precise circumstances she faced at the moment she pulled the trigger. How-
ever, perhaps attempting to bolster Tanya's testimony as to the imminency of
the danger and the reasonableness of her belief of the same, the Court used the
synonyms "precipitously" and "immediately" eight total times throughout the
opinion to describe the brief passage of time between her violent abuse and Da-
nuel's death.48 The Court also tried to bridge the evidentiary gaps by describing
the photographic evidence of Tanya's injuries, together with her testimony and
the fact that Danuel was found naked from the waist down, as "overwhelming
evidence [which] demonstrate[d] that any reasonable person similarly situated
would have believed that death or serious bodily injury were imminent."49 This
evidence, the Court continued, "established that the decedent's death precipi-
tously followed the decedent's having physically and sexually assaulted the
defendant."so
Despite the Court's declaration that it was "mindful" of previous
precedent requiring that "'[a]n appellate court must review all the evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial'. 5 and notwithstanding a hollow assurance of
"[h]aving fully considered the record in this appeal,"5 2 the Court simply ignored
important expert testimony put on by the State as illustrated in the next section.
The evidence that was not swept under the rug was quickly dismissed by the
Court as insufficient "suspicion and conjecture[,]" and "supposition. . . . A
separately-filed dissenting opinion was needed to fill in the evidentiary holes




48 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 631, 636, 642, 644-47 (W. Va. 2009).
49 Id. at 647.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 645-46 (quoting Syl. pt. 3, State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995)) (emphasis
added).
52 Id. at 646.
5 Id. at 632 n.3; see also id. at 647.
54 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 647-50 (W. Va. 2009) (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting).
2011] 979
9
Daines: State v. Harden: Muddying the Waters of Self-Defense Law in West
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
C. Expert Testimony Suggested That Danuel was Unarmed, Unconscious,
and Shot in the Head at Close Range
As previously noted, Danuel's blood alcohol content measured 0.22% at
the time of his death, nearly three times the legal limit in West Virginia.55 The
Court admitted that Danuel was found lying naked on the couch, but rejected the
inference that he was there because he was asleep or passed out drunk.56 The
Court pointed to the fact that "the State cannot say with any certainty the dece-
dent's disposition at the time of his death" as "compelling evidence of reasona-
ble doubt on this issue."S7 The Court continued:
Evidence that the decedent had sexually assaulted the defen-
dant, and thereafter lay sprawled naked from the waist down on
the living room couch does not amount to proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was asleep or passed out
drunk; instead, it is equally plausible that the decedent could
have been doing exactly what the defendant testified he was
doing, which was renewing his threats to kill her and the child-
ren and again becoming physically aggressive.
This statement makes it obvious which evidence the Court found more
credible.59 Presumably, the inference that the Court wished to create was that
Danuel, naked from the waist down, landed on the couch after being shot.
However, in light of other expert testimony ignored by the Court, this theory
becomes hard to defend.
The majority failed to mention the findings of the investigating police
officer, Sergeant David Castle, who testified that the "high and low velocity
blood spatter and blood pooling present on the carpet indicated that [Danuel]
was lying flat on his back when he was shot from behind." 60 Sergeant Castle
also testified from the blood stain evidence that Danuel's "left hand was lying
just above his head and resting on a pillow, and the decedent's right hand was
5 Id. at 632.
56 Id. at 646.
57 Id.
58 Id.
5 A full critique of the Court's actions on this issue will be provided in Part III, infra.
6 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 648 (W. Va. 2009) (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting). The ex-
pert testimony paints the picture that Tanya was standing behind the couch upon which Danuel
was resting at the time of the shooting, not directly behind Danuel. Indeed, it would be impossible
to be directly behind Danuel if he was lying flat on his back on the couch. This position-Danuel
laying (lower) on the couch and Tanya standing (higher) behind the couch-also explains why the
gun shot's trajectory was downward entering just above Danuel's right temple. See infra notes
61-68 and accompanying text.
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clutching a blanket."6 1 Sergeant Castle used these findings to support his expert
opinion that Danuel could not have been holding a weapon when he was shot.62
The State also called Dr. Hamada Mahmoud, a forensic pathologist and
the Chief Deputy Medical Examiner, as an expert witness.63 Dr. Mahmoud ex-
amined Danuel's body, and testified that Danuel was "shot above his right ear
with a left and downward trajectory."6 More importantly, Dr. Mahmoud testi-
fied that "the stippling found around the entrance wound as well as the 25 shot-
gun pellets and the shell's wadding found in [Danuel's] brain cavity indicate[d]
that the shotgun blast came from close range, specifically one to five feet
away."65 Taken together, Dr. Mahmoud and Sergeant Castle's expert findings
seemingly undermine the implausible landed-on-the-couch scenario the Court
re-created by relying upon the hospital photos and Tanya's testimony. At trial,
the jury was faced with all the evidence produced at trial and was charged with
finding the facts. Furthermore, it was instructed that in order to successfully
assert self-defense, the evidence had to show that Tanya had to have reason to
believe that she faced imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and that
proportionate deadly force had to be used to repel that danger.6 6 The jury ulti-
mately weighed all the evidence and concluded that, beyond all reasonable
doubt, the circumstances were not such as to indicate that Tanya faced imminent
danger when she shot Danuel. It would also follow that, given the State's expert
testimony as to the lack of the imminent danger requirement, the jury could
have also concluded that the deadly force Tanya used was not proportionate to
the danger she faced when she pulled the trigger. Consequently, the jury con-
victed her of first degree murder.67
After discussing the expert testimony that the Court failed to mention on
appeal, dissenting Chief Justice Benjamin gave proper deference to the jury's
findings of fact and noted the inferences that the jury could have drawn from the
expert testimony:
From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that [Tanya], while standing behind [Danuel], fired a shotgun
blast from close range into [Danuel's] right temple ... as he lay
flat on the sofa. A rational trier of fact could also infer that be-
61 Id.





6 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 634 n.4 (W. Va. 2009). While the Court took issue with
another section of the jury instruction that will be discussed hereafter, it later affirmed that "'im-
minent' risk of death or serious bodily injury[]" was still a required element of self-defense. See
id. at 641.
67 Id. at 631.
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cause [Danuel] made no effort to prevent [Tanya] from walking
up to him and firing a shotgun blast into his right temple, [Da-
nuel] must have been unconscious. Finally, a rational trier of
fact could additionally infer that because [Danuel] was uncons-
cious, he could not pose an imminent risk of serious bodily in-
jury or death to [Tanya]. These reasonable conclusions drawn
from the evidence negate [Tanya's] theory of self-defense.68
After crediting the jury with the inferences that could have been, and
probably were drawn from the State's expert evidence, Chief Justice Benjamin
correctly noted that first, the Court simply abandoned the appropriate standard
of review, and second, it usurped the fact-finding role of the jury.69 Part III will
further illustrate these two points.
III. DROPPING THE PROCEDURAL BALL
A. Giving Lip Service to the Standard of Review
Although the Court cited many binding principles regarding the stan-
dard of review to be applied on appeal, it failed to adhere to them. It first cited a
prior holding that "'[a] reviewing court should not reverse a criminal case on the
facts which have been passed upon by the jury. .. ."'70 The Court listed an ex-
ception to this rule, explaining that two prerequisites must be met in order for an
appellate court to overturn a jury verdict: (1) there must be reasonable doubt of
guilt; and (2) the verdict had to have resulted from 'misapprehension, or pas-
sion and prejudice."' 7 1 Later, the Court cited another precedent that explained
what was necessary for the appellate court to find that the first prerequisite had
been met: "[A] jury verdict should be set aside only when the record contains no
evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."7 2
The Court also recognized that it had a duty to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State as the verdict winner below. However, "this
68 Id. at 648-49.
69 Id. at 650.
70 Id. at 633 (quoting Syl. pt. 3, State v. Sprigg, 137 S.E. 746 (W. Va. 1927); Syl. pt. 1, State v.
Easton, 510 S.E.2d 465 (W. Va. 1998)).
71 Id.
72 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 646 (W. Va. 2009) (citing Syl. pt. 3, State v. Guthrie, 461
S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995)) (emphasis added).
73 Id. ("[W]e clearly must, according to our precedent, construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence . . ."); see also
id. at 633 ("[T]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favora-
ble to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citing Syl. pt. 1, Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d at 169); id. at
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is not to say that [the Court] must abandon sound reasoning in so doing."74
Ironically, not only did the Court abandon sound reasoning, but worse, it aban-
doned the standards of review it purported to follow when it ignored important
expert testimony to conclude that the State's evidence created only "suspicion or
conjecture" that the brutal beating had already ended when Tanya killed Da-
nuel. 5 Because there was evidence in the form of expert testimony from which
the jury could (and did) find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as Chief Justice
76
Benjamin made clear in his dissent, the first prerequisite to overturn the jury
verdict could not have been met. Because one of the prerequisites could not
have been met, the Court did not adhere to the standard of review when it over-
ruled the jury verdict.
B. Usurping the Fact-Finding Role of the Jury
It has long been the practice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals not to disturb the jury's ultimate findings of fact where, as in State v.
Harden, there was conflicting evidence at trial, unless in the rare instance where
"there was absolutely no evidence of the crime charged." 77 An early case em-
phasizing this fundamental principle of juror deference was State v. Piscioneri,
where the defendants appealed their convictions for wounding a young man
with the intent maim, disfigure, disable, or kill him and for conspiring to steal
his property. They filed a broad writ of error relating to the general refusal
and admission of evidence. 79 Noting that there was conflicting evidence at trial,
the Court affirmed the defendants' convictions and convincingly explained why
it could not second-guess the jury's findings of fact regarding the conflicting
evidence:
The jury were the sole judges of the conflicting testimony. The
witnesses were before them. They saw the manners and the
countenances of those witnesses. They were in a position to
judge as to credibility. It was peculiarly the province of the jury
to do so. The jury had the right to believe one, if they deemed
him alone credible, and to disbelieve others they deemed not
credible. We have no legal power to disturb the finding of the
jury, since it is deduced from conflicting testimony and involves
645 ("A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction
takes on a heavy burden.") (citing Syl. pt. 1, Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d at 169).
74 Id. at 646.
7 Id. (internal citations omitted).
76 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
" State v. Piscioneri, 69 S.E. 375, 377 (W. Va. 1910).
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judgment as to the credibility of witnesses. If there were abso-
lutely no evidence of the crime charged, it would be otherwise.
"To set aside a verdict in such a case, approved by a circuit
court, would be an abuse of power. Of what force the constitu-
tion in its guaranty of a jury trial, if in such case an appellate
court can set aside a verdict only because it difers with the
jury?"
80
Indeed, in West Virginia and elsewhere, "no principle is more firmly established
than that, where the evidence is sufficiently conflicting to warrant a difference
of opinion, the verdict of the jury, after confirmation by the trial court, must
prevail." 8'
This bedrock principle of appellate deference to the jury where there is
conflicting evidence also applies to cases such as State v. Harden where a de-
fendant appeals his or her guilty verdict after unsuccessfully pleading self-
defense at the murder trial. For example, in State v. Roberts, the Court recog-
nized that there was conflicting oral evidence regarding the issue of self-
defense.8 2 The Court deferred to the jury verdict, stating that the case was "de-
pendent upon conflicting oral evidence, thus making the credibility of witnesses
an important factor," and concluded that "the verdict approved by the trial court
must stand, even if we can say there was excess in quantum of evidence in be-
half of defendant."83 The Court also noted that "it [would be] an abuse of power
for this court to set aside a verdict merely because its members would not have
so found."84
The principle of appellate deference has stood the test of time. In Stra-
hin v. Cleavenger, a case decided in 2004, the plaintiff was seriously injured
after he was shot in the arm by the defendant.85 In the civil suit for damages, the
jury found that the plaintiff was thirty percent liable based on the element of
foreseeability, and the defendant was seventy percent liable for his intentional
shooting of the victim.8 Thus, the plaintiff was held jointly and severally liable
for the jury's award of over one million dollars in damages.8 7 In a separate opi-
nion, Justice Starcher of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concurred
with the Court's ruling to affirm the jury's finding of facts, and "respond[ed] to
the implication raised by the dissent that we should have made findings of
fact-and thereby intrude upon the province of the jury-in order to reach a
so Id. at 377 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Stowers, 66 S.E. 323, 326 (W. Va. 1909)).
s1 State v. Hurst, 116 S.E. 248, 250 (W. Va. 1923) (citations omitted).
82 63 S.E. 282, 282 (W. Va. 1908).
83 Id (citations omitted).
84 Id.
ss 603 S.E.2d 197, 203-04 (W. Va. 2004).
86 Id. at 204.
87 Id. at 211 n.14.
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contrary conclusion regarding foreseeability."" Justice Starcher admonished,
"We cannot usurp the role of the jury nor substitute our judgment when we may
differ with a fact-driven outcome."89 In the same vein, the Court in Harden
even reaffirmed a previous holding requiring that it "must credit all inferences
and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of the prose-
cution. . . . Credibility determinations are for a jury and not an appellate
court."90
Given the firmly embedded precedent on the issue, how could the Court
in Harden possibly manage to substitute its version of the facts for the jury's
findings without running afoul of the well-established principle of appellate
restraint and respect for the jury's role as fact-finder when there is conflicting
evidence? By not bothering to address the State's expert testimony regarding
the downward trajectory of the shotgun blast; the stippling, pellets, and wadding
inside Danuel's brain cavity that suggested that the shotgun was fired at a very
close range; the blood spatter and stain evidence that suggested that Danuel was
lying flat on his back with one arm clutching a blanket and the other resting
behind his head, the Court painted an evidentiary picture in which there was no
other evidence that seriously conflicted with Tanya's testimony and the hospital
photos. This crafty sidestepping of the principle of appellate deference to the
jury's findings of fact and credibility determinations also relieved the Court of
having to credit the State with the inferences that the jury drew from the State's
evidence, as outlined in Chief Justice Benjamin's dissent. '
Although one may disagree with the jury's findings of fact or its credi-
bility determinations in light of conflicting evidence, the fact remains that those
decisions were the jury's alone to make. Where, as here, an appellate court
reaches a contrary conclusion after reviewing conflicting evidence from a cold
record, the result is a textbook abuse of appellate power.
C. Misapprehending the Law vs. Misapprehending the Evidence: Distin-
guishing State v. Hardenfrom State v. Cook
It was noted earlier that in order to reverse a criminal conviction, a re-
viewing Court must find that the guilty verdict "must have been the result of
misapprehension, or passion and prejudice."'92 Ultimately, the Court disposed
of the Harden case by reversing Tanya's guilty verdict and sentence, barring a
retrial, and ordering an immediate acquittal. In reaching this disposition, the
88 Id. at 213 (Starcher, J., concurring).
89 Id.
90 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 645-46 (W. Va. 2009) (citing Syl. pt. 3, State v. Guthrie,
461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995)).
91 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 71.
9 Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 647. In a discussion hosted by the Women's Law Caucus at the West
Virginia University College of Law in April 2010, Mrs. Harden's appellate counsel, Russ Cook,
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Court relied on a prior case, State v. Cook, and paternalistically noted that
"while we must be '[m]indful of the jury's province over the evidence presented
... this Court will not permit an injustice to occur because a jury failed to ade-
quately understand the evidence presented at trial."' 94
With no explanation as to how the Harden jury misunderstood the evi-
dence as did the Cook jury, the Court simply said that "[w]e agree with that
principle, and conclude that '[t]his is such a case."' 95 Surprisingly, the Court
did not analogize to Cook or attempt a case illustration, and a closer look at the
Cook case reveals why. It is easily distinguishable from Harden because at its
core, the Cook case illustrates a jury's misapprehension of the evidence (thereby
satisfying the standard of review); whereas Harden illustrates a jury's misap-
prehension not of the evidence, but of the law. The significant evidentiary and
legal distinctions between the two cases will be identified below, but a brief
overview of the facts of Cook is necessary to understand the distinctions.
In Cook, the defendant appealed her second degree murder conviction,
alleging that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not
act in defense of another when she shot and killed her husband's attacker with a
shotgun.96 A few months before the fateful day the Cooks purchased a two acre
tract of land and prepared to build a house upon it, but one of their neighbors,
Homer Buckler, continually harassed and threatened the Cooks, tore down their
fence, harassed Mr. Cook's ninety-two year old father, piled rocks and dirt in
their driveway, and vandalized the Cook's cabin.97 The Cooks contacted the
local sheriff, who asked Mr. Buckler to apologize to the Cooks, but instead of
apologizing, Mr. Buckler told them he would kill them if they dared call the
authorities again regarding his conduct.
On May 7, 1997, Mrs. Cook heard a loud truck engine racing outside
her home and saw Mr. Buckler throwing rocks at her property and at her hus-
band.99 She loaded a shotgun, went outside, and fired a warning shot hoping
Mr. Buckler would leave. 00 When the menacing conduct escalated, Mrs. Cook
rushed to her husband's side, loaded another shot, and Mr. Buckler asked,
"What are you going to do, shoot me?" 01 Mrs. Cook told him she did not want
to hurt anybody, and she pleaded with Mr. Buckler to just leave them alone.102
admitted that the best result he initially hoped for was a retrial. He was pleasantly surprised and
"shocked" when he read the opinion ordering the immediate acquittal of his client.
94 Id. (quoting State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127, 138 (W. Va. 1999)).
9s Id. (quoting Cook, 515 S.E.2d at 138).
96 Cook, 515 S.E.2d at 129.
97 Id. at 130-31.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 131.
'" State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127, 131 (W. Va. 1999).
1o1 Id.
102 Id
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After learning that Mrs. Cook had called the police, Mr. Buckler, standing at six
feet, four inches and weighing over three hundred pounds, turned to Mr. Cook,
who was only five feet, six inches and weighed only one hundred and forty
pounds, and threatened, "'You're a [expletive] dead man. I warned you, I told
you to never call them.",
0 3
As the Cooks turned to walk away, Mr. Buckler spun Mr. Cook around,
threw him to the ground, and started swinging his fists and beating him.'0 As
Mr. Cook was begging for mercy, Mrs. Cook rushed to his side, and tried pull-
ing Mr. Buckler away with one hand while holding the shotgun in the other. 05
Mr. Buckler stopped beating Mr. Cook long enough to hit Mrs. Cook and rip her
shirt open, who later testified that at this point, she was terrified that Mr. Buck-
ler was going to make good on his threat and kill her husband.10 6 Even after
getting hit, Mrs. Cook still pleaded for Mr. Buckler to stop, but he ignored her
and continued beating her husband. 0 7 Fearing for her husband's life, and after
unsuccessfully trying to pull Mr. Buckler off her husband, Mrs. Cook took aim
at Mr. Buckler's right arm.'08 As she shot, Mr. Buckler lifted up his right arm to
hit Mr. Cook again, so the blast hit Mr. Buckler in the right armpit, causing him
to fall off Mr. Cook.' 09 Mrs. Cook reloaded the shotgun in case she needed to
fire a second shot, but she did not fire again because Mr. Buckler was on the
ground and the violence had ended. "o
1. Evidentiary Distinctions Between Harden and Cook
There are two important evidentiary distinctions that should be noted
between Harden and Cook. First, unlike in Harden, where the only eyewitness
to Danuel's death was Tanya, there were three neighbors who saw and heard the
entire exchange between Mr. Buckler and the Cooks and testified as eyewit-
nesses, corroborating the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Cook."' There was no
corroborating eyewitness testimony supporting Tanya's story. The testimony of
these additional eyewitnesses in Cook confirmed that the Cooks did everything
in their power to avoid the confrontation: Mr. Buckler threatened Mr. Cook and
spun him around as he was walking away, Mr. Buckler threw him to the ground
103 Id. at 130-31.
' Id. at 131.
105 Id.
' State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127, 131 (W. Va. 1999)
107 Id. at 132.
108 Id
109 Id.
10 Id. Mr. Buckler lived for a short time after the shot, but was pronounced dead a few hours
later at a Cumberland, Maryland hospital. Id. at 133.
"I Id. at 131. Clayton Brent, Rebla Jackson, and her daughter, Norma Jackson, were all neigh-
bors who lived close to the Cooks. After hearing Mrs. Cook's first warning shot, they all went
outside to see what was going on. Id. at 131-32.
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and started "wailing" with his arms, "coming down with a lot of force," and
Mr. Buckler also struck Mrs. Cook.112
Second, unlike in Harden, where the Court disregarded the State's
compelling testimony which conflicted with Tanya's testimony, the Cook Court
addressed the State's evidence which conflicted with the Cooks' testimony and
the corroborating testimony of three eyewitnesses." 3  The State called Mr.
Buckler's twelve-year-old son to the stand, who testified that he was in the cab
of his dad's truck with his brother during the entire incident, and that he heard
more than he actually saw because it took place behind the truck.1 4 The Court
noted that "a careful reading of the child's testimony reveals that he selectively
informed the jury of what he saw and heard."" 5 After illustrating the child's
selective testimony and comparing it with the overwhelming corroborating eye-
witness testimony of the Cooks and their neighbors, the Court concluded:
[T]he law cannot allow empathy for the child to sway the bal-
ance of justice. In light of the corroborated testimony of three
eyewitnesses we must conclude that Mrs. Cook presented suffi-
cient evidence to force the state to have to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that she did not act in defense of another when
she used deadly force. The state failed to carry its burden on
this issue.'' 6
Therefore, the Cook case-from an evidentiary standpoint-is signifi-
cantly different from Harden because (1) the jury verdict in Cook was inconsis-
tent with the overwhelming, corroborating testimony of three eyewitnesses whe-
reas the verdict in Harden was only inconsistent with the defendant's uncorro-
borated testimony; and (2) the State's key witness upon whose testimony the
Cook jury relied was the victim's biased twelve year old son who heard more
than he saw whereas the State's key witnesses upon whose testimony the Har-
den jury relied were unbiased experts who testified to the gun's distance and
trajectory when fired, and the victim's body position when he was killed as as-
112 State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127, 131-33 (W. Va. 1999).
113 Id. at 139-40.
114 Id. at 139.
1" Id. at 139-40. The following exchange with the child took place on cross examination:
Q. Did you ever see Gerald start to walk away from your father? A. No. Q.
You didn't see that? Did you see your father walk behind Gerald? A. No. Q.
Did you see Gerald turn and try to push your father away? A. No. Q. Did you
see your father pull Gerald to the ground? A. No. Q. Did you see your father
standing over top of Gerald? A. No. Q. He wasn't hitting him. A. No. Q.
You don't remember Brenda Cook saying, stop, stop, please stop? A. No.
Id. at 140. ("The manner in which the child chose to testify is understandable. His father was
killed.").
116 Id. at 140.
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certained by a blood pooling and spattering analysis. For these two evidentiary
reasons, the Court was certainly more justified in its reversing Mrs. Cook's con-
viction than Mrs. Harden's.
Moreover, as Justice Workman clarified in a concurring opinion in
Cook, only in "rare and exceptional" cases should the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals overturn a jury verdict.'"7 It follows that if a subsequent ma-
jority on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cites Cook when revers-
ing a guilty verdict and barring a retrial, then the Court should at least try to
closely analogize to Cook, and establish what it is about that case that makes it
as "rare and exceptional" as Cook was." 8 Ironically, the Harden Court ignored
an important principle enunciated by the Court in Cook: "the law cannot allow
empathy for the child to sway the balance of justice."' 19 However, the Harden
Court seemingly swayed the balances of justice out of empathy for an abused
woman whereas in Cook it was unwilling to do so out of empathy for a young
child who lost his father.12 0 These multiple, significant evidentiary distinctions
between these two cases should have easily barred the Harden Court from citing
Cook to dispose of the case in the same manner.
2. Legal and Procedural Distinctions Between Harden and Cook
In addition to the evidentiary differences between Harden and Cook,
two important legal and procedural differences between the cases should have
prevented the Harden Court from a Cook-style disposition. These two related
differences are what make Cook a case about the jury's misapprehension of the
evidence and Harden a case about the jury's misapprehension of the law. First,
the Cook Court did not overturn any previous case law or make any substantive
changes to the law of the law of defense of another.121 Second, and as a result,
the Cook Court approved of the jury instructions given on the law of defense of
117 Id. at 140 (Workman, J., concurring) ("I write separately only to emphasize that it is the rare
and exceptional case in which I would embark on overturning a jury verdict . . . Justice Davis,
however, has made an obviously thorough review of all the evidence and has artfully set forth
why this case is that rare and exceptional one.").
118 State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127, 140 (W. Va. 1999).
" Id. at 139.
120 This statement should not be read to minimize or take lightly the seriousness of Tanya Har-
den's brutal abuse at the hands of her husband.
121 See Cook, 515 S.E.2d at 134-36 (stating that "[o]ur cases have succinctly articulated the
development and scope of the doctrine of self defense ... [h]owever, we have not had occasion to
thoroughly discuss the defense of another doctrine. The facts of the instant case require that we
fully explore this doctrine's principles."). The Court, after reviewing dozens of past West Virgin-
ia Supreme Court cases, decisions from courts of other states, decisions from the U.S. Supreme
Court, law review articles, treatises, stated, "{ihn this Court's review of its past decisions . . . the
doctrine of defense of another may be succinctly articulated." Id.
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others at the original trial.122 Because there was no confusion about which law
the jury was to apply and there were no new changes to incorporate to the law in
Cook, there was no need to remand back to the trial court for a new trial. In
other words, the jury in Cook misapprehended the evidence, not the law.
In contrast, the Court in Harden made significant new additions' 23 to the
law of self-defense and also overruled multiple precedential cases that will be
explained in greater detail in Part IV.124 The Court also objected to the jury
instructions regarding self-defense because a portion of the instruction was pre-
mised on one of the cases which the Court ultimately overruled.125 Similarly,
the Court took issue with some arguments made by the State during closing ar-
gument because again, they were based on precedent that the Court overruled on
appeal. 126
For these reasons, the Court cannot persuasively argue that the Harden
jury misapprehended the evidence, as did the jury in Cook. Instead, it is more
accurate to say that the Harden jury misapprehended the law ex ante, but only
because the Court had not yet made those significant changes. But even this is a
stretch. Can a jury be fairly faulted for "misapprehending" the law it does not
yet have-the law that the Court would later create?
Normally, under these circumstances one would expect a reviewing
court to remand back to the circuit court for a new trial to give the jury an op-
portunity to apply the law consistent with the appellate court's holdings.12 7 The
122 Id. at 138 ("The trial court gave an adequate instruction of the law regarding the defense to
the jury.").
123 Syl. pt. 4, State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 631 (W. Va. 2009) ("Where it is determined that
the defendant's actions were not reasonably made in self-defense, evidence that the decedent had
abused or threatened the life of the defendant is nonetheless relevant and may negate or tend to
negate a necessary element of the offense(s) charged, such as malice or intent."); see also id. at
649 (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting) ("[N]ew Syllabus Point 4 was created by the majority from whole
cloth and has absolutely no support in the precedent of this Court.").
124 Syl. pt. 3, id at 631 ("Our holding in Syllabus Point 6 of State v. McMillion .. . is expressly
overruled.") (citation omitted); Syl. pt. 5, id. ("Our decision in Syllabus Point 2, State v. Crawford
... is expressly overruled.") (citation omitted).
125 Id. at 634, 637 ("It is clear from the record that the State bases its arguments largely on
Syllabus Point 6 of our decision in State v. McMillion . . . . It is also clear that the State bases its
argument on the trial court's self-defense instruction." After reviewing and overruling McMillion,
the Court stated, "[h]aving thus concluded, we find the State's arguments above-described unper-
suasive."); see infra Part W.A.
126 Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 637 (Before concluding that an occupant of a home no longer had a
duty to retreat if attacked by a co-occupant, the Court pointed out that "during closing arguments
the State advanced this argument, telling the jury that the defendant 'could have walked out of that
trailer. Period. But she didn't.' Implicit in this argument is that the defendant had a duty to re-
treat from her home.").
127 Indeed, as detailed in supra note 93, this is the best-case scenario that Harden's appellate
counsel, Russ Cook, had hoped for. Also, it should be noted that this result does not conflict with
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 9
(1978) ("It is elementary in our law that a person can be tried a second time for an offense when
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Court, however, barred a retrial, and on remand ordered the circuit judge to en-
ter an immediate order of acquittal. 12 8 Did the Court perhaps deny a retrial and
order the immediate acquittal out of fear that, even if the jury applied the new
law and had new jury instructions reflecting the new law, the jury would still
reach the same guilty verdict? Because the Court did not explain its motivations
other than by citing to Cook,12 9 which was significantly different from Harden
on evidentiary and legal grounds, one can only speculate about why the Court
did not provide for a retrial on remand consistent with the new law it created.
IV. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY LAW
After a review of the procedural flaws of the Court's decision in Har-
den, it is now an appropriate time to outline the Court's substantive changes to
the law of self-defense. Part IV.A. outlines how the Court cleared up a lot of
confusion by overruling State v. McMillion.'30 Part IV.B. discusses how the
Court backtracked by injecting more confusion to the law of self-defense by
creating a new syllabus point which is wholly unsupported by previous
precedent. Finally, Part IV.C. addresses how the Court took the positive step of
moving West Virginia from the minority to the majority of the other states re-
garding the duty to retreat.
A. Reconciling Reasonableness, Imminent Danger, and Previous Appre-
hensions ofDanger: Ridding Jury Instructions ofMcMillion Confusion
As alluded to above,' 3 ' the Court correctly overruled a previous case
upon which a portion of the jury instructions on self-defense and the State's
argument was based.132 Specifically, the Court took issue with the poorly-
phrased precedent: "No apprehension of danger previously entertained will jus-
tify the commission of the homicide; it must be an apprehension existing at the
time the defendant fired the fatal shot." 33 This precedent was woven into the
jury instruction given at Tanya's trial, "[Y]ou must find that the apprehension
existed at the time that the defendant attacked the victim. No apprehension of
danger previously entertained will justify the commission of homicide." 34
his prior conviction for that same offense has been set aside by his appeal."); Forman v. United
States, 361 U.S. 481, 486-87 (1960), rev'don other grounds.
128 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
130 138 S.E. 732 (W. Va. 1927).
131 See supra note 124.
132 See State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 633-3 7 (W. Va. 2009).
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When read in context, however, the McMillion holding was just a con-
fusing, somewhat archaic way of describing the imminent danger requirement of
self-defense,135 which the Court ultimately left intact. The sentence immediate-
ly preceding the McMillion language about previous apprehensions of danger
illustrates this point: "Under his plea of self-defense, the burden of showing the
imminency of the danger rests upon the defendant. No apprehension of danger
previously entertained ... "' Even so, the Court characterized the McMillion
language not as if it spoke directly to the imminent danger requirement itself,
but as though it absolutely prohibited the admission of any evidence of previous
misapprehensions of danger to help the jury evaluate the reasonableness of the
defendant's belief of the imminent danger.'3 7
As the Court correctly explained, the reasonableness of the defendant's
belief that when she acted in self-defense, she was in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily injury, involves a two-part inquiry, with subjective and objec-
tive components.' 38 The Court summarized this two-part inquiry:
First, a defendant's belief that death or serious bodily injury
was imminent must be shown to have been subjectively reason-
able, which is to say that a defendant actually believed, based
upon all the circumstances perceived by him or her at the time
deadly force was used, that such force was necessary to prevent
death or serious bodily injury. Second, that the defendant's be-
lief must be objectively reasonable when considering all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the defendant's use of deadly force,
which is to say that another person, similarly situated, could
have reasonably formed the same belief.139
It then follows that, to the extent that McMillion could be understood by
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and especially lay jurors to prohibit the admis-
sion of any evidence of previous misapprehensions of danger, this two-part in-
quiry would be meaningless. How could a jury effectively evaluate the reason-
ableness of a defendant's belief that his or her life was imminently in danger if it
could not hear evidence regarding the prior circumstances leading up to the de-
fendant's actions in self-defense? This absolute prohibition would certainly
exclude many of the circumstances that had bearing on the defendant's mental
state when she acted in self-defense. Accordingly, this absolute prohibition, as
135 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
136 Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 634 (citing Syl. pt. 6, McMillion, 138 S.E. 732).
137 Id. at 635 (noting that "[o]ur precedent since McMillion clearly establishes that a defendant .
. . is entitled 'to elicit testimony about the prior physical beatings she received in order that the
jury may fully evaluate and consider the defendant's mental state at the time of the commission of
the offense."') (quoting State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979)).
'3 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 634-35 (W. Va. 2009).
139 Id. at 635.
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the Court correctly noted, would conflict with more recent case law establishing
that "the reasonableness of the [defendant's] conduct may depend upon past
actions of the decedent, including threats, violence, and general reputation."I 4 0
Ultimately, in expressly overruling McMillion, the Court held that
"where a defendant has asserted a plea of self-defense, evidence showing that
the decedent had previously abused or threatened the life of the defendant is
relevant evidence of the defendant's state of mind at the time deadly force was
used."l41  Therefore, the Court's minor mischaracterization of the McMillion
language is excusable for two reasons. First, there is very little difference be-
tween the imminent danger requirement itself and the requirement that the de-
fendant's belief of the imminent danger be reasonable. Second, and more im-
portantly, eliminating the outdated and confusing McMillion language was abso-
lutely necessary to clear up any future confusion and possible blurring of these
two self-defense requirements. The Court is to be commended for clearing up
any confusion caused by McMillion. Fortunately for future criminal defendants,
self-defense instructions free of references to this outdated and puzzling sylla-
bus point will be more readily understood by the jury.
B. New Syllabus Point 4: Negating Necessary Elements of the Offenses
Charged, Despite a Lack of Evidence of Self-Defense?
After clarifying the law of self-defense in this regard, the Court erased
its gains by creating a new syllabus point which lacked any significant explana-
tion or support in prior case law. After overruling McMillion, the Court went on
to hold that "where it is determined that the defendant's actions were not rea-
sonably made in self-defense, evidence that the decedent had abused or threat-
ened the life of the defendant is nonetheless relevant and may negate or tend to
negate a necessary element of the offense(s) charged, such as malice or in-
tent." 4 2 The Court's failure to provide any guidance or examples to aid in the
interpretation of this groundbreaking new syllabus point is deeply troubling and
inexcusable.
What cases does the Court cite in support of this new holding? The
Court stated that, "We have similarly held that evidence of prior threats and
violence is relevant to 'negate criminal intent."' 1 4 3 The Court also explained
that "a defendant's domestic abuse was relevant 'to establish either the lack of
malice, intention, or awareness, and thus negate or tend to negate a necessary
element of one or the other offenses charged."'" Notice the italicized, signifi-
140 Id. (citing State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d 550, 556 (W. Va. 1981)); see also supra note 137,
and accompanying text.
141 Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 636.
142 Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
143 Id. at 635 (quoting State v. Lambert, 312 S.E.2d 31, 35 (W. Va. 1984)).
'" State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 635 (W. Va. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting State v.
Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 149 (W. Va. 1996)).
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cant addition that the Court inserted right before the actual language from the
prior case. That the Court felt the need to graft the italicized phrase onto the
prior precedent, attempting to ground its new holding in a previous one, is a
telltale sign that the Court went out on a limb.
Chief Justice Benjamin in dissent correctly called foul on the Court's
dramatic stretching of past precedent.145 Specifically, the Court mistakenly re-
lied on State v. Lambert which concerned the effects of the defenses of compul-
sion, coercion, and duress upon criminal intent and provided that "' [t]he com-
pulsion or coercion that will excuse an otherwise criminal act must be present,
imminent, and impending, and such as would induce a well-grounded apprehen-
sion of death or serious bodily harm if the criminal act is not done[.]'" 6 More-
over, in Lambert, there was sufficient corroborated testimony and evidence to
establish a legitimate defense of coercion, negating an element of the offense of
welfare fraud.147 In contrast, under new syllabus point 4, sufficient evidence of
self-defense is not needed to negate an element of the offense charged as long as
there is sufficient evidence of past abuse or threats. Thus, it is hard to see how
Lambert provides any support for new syllabus point 4.
In addition, the Court wrongly relied upon State v. Wyatt, a case which
largely revolved around the Battered Spouse Syndrome.14 8 Chief Justice Ben-
jamin easily distinguished Wyatt from Harden: "The majority also cites State v.
Wyatt. . . . [h]owever, Wyatt concerned the Battered Spouse Syndrome which
was not raised by the defendant at trial [in this case] and was not supported by
the evidence." 49
Apart from the untenable legal grounds which the Court cited in creat-
ing new syllabus point 4, its sweeping implications are equally disconcerting. A
fair reading of the syllabus point indicates that even when the evidence shows
that a defendant did not act in self-defense, he or she could still be legally justi-
fied upon a showing that the decedent previously abused the defendant. There-
fore, if at least one of the six elements of self-defense is lacking,"50 a defendant
would still be justified in killing as long as the decedent previously abused the
145 Id. at 649 (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting) ("[N]ew Syllabus Point 4 was created by the majority
from whole cloth and has absolutely no support in the precedent of this Court. Under this Court's
precedent, evidence that the decedent had abused or threatened the life of the defendant is admiss-
ible to support a self-defense claim but is not admissible to negate a necessary element of the
offense charged in the absence of self-defense or other specific defenses enumerated by this
Court. In addition, the cases cited by the majority opinion in support of Syllabus Point 4 simply
do not stand for the proposition for which they are cited.").
1" Id. (quoting Lambert, 312 S.E.2d at 33).
147 Lambert, 312 S.E.2d at 34 ("In the present case, the appellant's testimony concerning the
coercion of her husband was not uncorroborated, and was sufficient to warrant the giving of a
coercion instruction to the jury.") (emphasis added).
148 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 649 (W. Va. 2009) (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147).
149 Id. (emphasis added); see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 23.
Iso See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
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defendant. Does this mean that from here on out, the imminent danger require-
ment has been relaxed, or abolished altogether for battered spouse defendants,
as so many scholars and commentators desire?' 1 Could this also mean that one
would still be justified if another self-defense requirement was lacking-for
instance-that the defendant was not the aggressor? What of the proportionality
requirement?1 52 Could a hypothetical battered spouse be justified in shooting
her abuser at point-blank range after he merely grabs her by the arm? What
about the objectively reasonable requirement that the defendant claiming self-
defense must have an objectively reasonable belief that deadly force was neces-
sary? Could this, too, be excused as long as there is evidence of domestic vi-
olence? Finally, what about the passage of time between the domestic violence
and the homicide? Would evidence of domestic violence which occurred a day
before, a week before, a year before, or a decade before the homicide still be
sufficient to negate a necessary element of a murder charge?
Under a fair reading of new syllabus point 4, these are all possible out-
comes, which is exactly why the Court's complete failure to confine or explain
this syllabus point is so unnerving. Without any further guidance or clarifica-
tion from the Court, new syllabus point 4 seemingly creates gaping loop holes
through which defense counsel representing battered clients may end-run around
any one of the self-defense requirements simply by putting on evidence of do-
mestic abuse, no matter when it last occurred or how serious it was. An ade-
quate explanation addressing these legitimate questions is sorely needed for
lower court judges and practitioners.
These hypothetical, yet plausible scenarios perfectly exemplify the fears
of one commentator who noted, "[W]hen one seeks to pull at the thread of im-
minence, the fabric of self-defense unravels."1 54 While future jury instructions
will be easier to understand without references to the confusing language of
McMillion, the Court generated much more confusion when it created new syl-
labus point 4 with no guidance, explanation or valid support from past
precedent.
151 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
1s3 See Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 649-50 (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting) (fearing the resulting effects
of new syllabus point 4: "By placing absolutely no limit on the use of evidence of prior abusive
conduct to negate an element of the crime charged, the majority unwittingly permits a defendant
to claim that the most senseless murder is justified by an allegation that the decedent had wronged
the defendant or posed a threat to the defendant. Until the creation of new Syllabus Point 4, such
a notion was totally foreign to our jurisprudence.").
154 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ.
L. REv. 213, 217 (2004).
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C. Moving from the Minority to the Majority: Eliminating the Duty to Re-
treat from an Attacking Co-Occupant and Overruling State v. Crawford
The Court buried a West Virginia precedent that had survived for far too
long when it seized upon the State's naYve argument made at closing: that
Tanya "could have walked out of that trailer [while Danuel was either passed
out or asleep]. Period. But she didn't."'5 5 . The Court disagreed with this
statement by saying, "Implicit in this argument is that the defendant had a duty
to retreat from her home."' 5 6 In fact, as the law of self-defense stood in West
Virginia prior to Harden, if an unlawful intruder invaded the sanctity of anoth-
er's home, the latter had no duty to retreat, but could stand his or her ground and
defend the "castle."l5 7 However, State v. Crawford, a case decided over a cen-
tury ago, carved out a baffling exception to the castle doctrine: if a person was
under attack by a lawful co-occupant of the home (as opposed to an intruder),
the former was under a legal duty to retreat.158
After a thorough review of various cases from other courts, surveying
the majority and minority states in regards to the duty to retreat,15 9 and after
examining the public policy consequences of this duty, the Court rightly over-
ruled Crawford,60 specifically holding that:
An occupant who is, without provocation, attacked in his or her
home, dwelling or place of temporary abode, by a co-occupant
who also has a lawful right to be upon the premises, may invoke
the law of self-defense and in such circumstances use deadly
force, without retreating, where the occupant reasonably be-
lieves, and does believe, that he or she is at imminent risk of
death or serious bodily injury.
1ss State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 637 (W. Va. 2009).
156 Id. To be fair, if the State really wanted to imply that there was a duty to retreat or make it a
part of their case theme, it probably would have used stronger language than "could have walked
out of that trailer." Id.
15 Id.
158 Syl. pt. 2, State v. Crawford, 66 S.E. 110 (W. Va. 1909) ("On a trial for murder, instructions
to the jury asserting defendant's right to stand his ground and not retreat ... are inapplicable
where the evidence shows defendant and deceased were at the time of the homicide jointly occu-
pying the house where the killing occurred .... .").
159 Harden, 679 S.E.2d at 638. As of 1999, only Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and West Virginia imposed a duty to retreat
upon a person under attack from a co-occupant. As of the summer of 2009, when Harden was
decided, the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and now West Virginia do not impose a duty to retreat
on persons under attack from co-occupants of the home. Id. at 637 n.7, 638.
'60 Id at 637-40.
161 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 640 (W. Va. 2009).
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This much-needed decision recognizes the reality that when a battered
spouse retreats from an attacking co-occupant, often times she is worse off than
she would have been had she just stayed and succumbed to the violence. For
instance, as the New Jersey Supreme Court correctly noted, "During repeated
instanced of past abuse, she has 'retreated,' only to be caught, dragged back
inside, and severely beaten again. If she manages to escape, other hurdles con-
front her. Where will she go if she has no money, no transportation, and if her
children are left behind . . . ?"162 Justice Cardozo, pointing out the inherent un-
fairness of such a duty, rhetorically asked, "'Flight is for sanctuary and shelter,
and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home . .. Why .. . should one retreat from
his own house, when assailed by a partner or co-tenant, any more than when
assailed by a stranger who is lawfully upon the premises?"63 The Court, re-
cognizing the absurdity and danger of the distinction, promoted sound public
policy by abandoning the duty to retreat altogether when the circumstances give
rise to the use of deadly force in self-defense.
In addition, the Court was careful to give guidance to future judges and
practitioners by explaining the scope of its new holding in a footnote. Under the
"castle doctrine," the threat threshold is relatively low, meaning that one is justi-
fied in defending herself and her home with deadly force if the intruder merely
threatens her or threatens to commit a felony.' But the Court, in removing the
duty to retreat from an attacking co-occupant, was careful to explicitly state that
the threat threshold remained high in cases of self-defense.' 65 The Court rea-
soned that, "Given that heated exchanges may be commonplace between house-
hold occupants, we believe the greater threat of imminent death or serious bodi-
ly injury is necessary to justify the use of deadly force between co-
occupants." 66
Even though the removal of the duty to retreat was a very positive step
in the self-defense law of West Virginia, as Chief Justice Benjamin conceded in
dissent, he argued that this new holding was completely irrelevant to the facts of
Harden:
While I do not disagree with new Syllabus Point 5, it has no ap-
plication to the facts of this case. Simply because a co-occupant
of a residence has no legal obligation to retreat from the resi-
dence in the face of the imminent threat of serious bodily injury
or death, it does not follow that the co-occupant has the right to
shoot an incapacitated person in the head at close range. Be-
cause the facts of this case do not support a self-defense claim,
162 Id. at 639 (citing New Jersey v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570-71 (N.J. 1997)).
163 Id. at 639-40 (citing People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 499-500 (N.Y. 1914)).
' Id. at 640 n.9.
165 Id.
16 Id. at 640.
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Syllabus Points 5 is wholly irrelevant to the decision of this
case.167
This statement acknowledges the State's expert testimony that the Court
ignored, and credits the jury with the reasonable inferences that could have been
drawn from it, as the proper standards of review require.'68 Although syllabus
point 5 is perhaps irrelevant to the facts of Harden, it nevertheless represents a
positive and encouraging advancement in self-defense law of West Virginia.
This holding moves the state to the commanding position of the majority of oth-
er states which do not place a duty to retreat on occupants of a home when they
are attacked by a co-occupant.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether one agrees with the decision in State v. Harden, there is no
doubt or disagreement that its holdings will reverberate upon and affect all fu-
ture self-defense cases. Especially those involving evidence of battered spous-
es, even though the Battered Spouse Defense was not raised at Tanya's trial.
Procedurally, the Court mishandled this case. It gave only lip service to the
standard of review by failing to even acknowledge the State's most compelling
expert testimony. It also failed to credit the jury with the inferences it drew
from all the evidence, and ignored the credibility determinations the jury made
during trial. The Court painted an evidentiary picture that conveniently fit the
requirements of self-defense. This amounted to a usurpation of the jury's fact-
finding role by an appellate court. Also, by relying upon an easily distinguisha-
ble case to bar a retrial, even after significantly altering the self-defense legal
landscape, the Court opened the door for future courts to follow in its footsteps
when it differs with a factually-driven outcome below. This in turn eats away at
the notion that in order to dispose of a case as the Cook court did, the case has to
be rare and exceptional.
Substantively, the Harden decision was a mixed bag. To be sure, the
Court made positive changes in the law by eliminating the archaic and perplex-
ing language of McMillion and the unfair duty to retreat from an attacking co-
occupant established by Crawford. However, new syllabus point 4 should raise
eyebrows. Even when there is insufficient evidence of self-defense, meaning
that one or more of its elements are lacking, the defendant could still be justified
in using deadly force if it can be shown that he or she had previously been
threatened or abused. This is an enormous upheaval in the law that will surely
impact future battered spouse cases. The policy implications of the Court's de-
cision should be thoroughly debated by the West Virginia House of Delegates.
At a minimum, the Court should take the next available opportunity to give any
167 State v. Harden, 679 S.E.2d 628, 649 (W. Va. 2009) (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting).
168 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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meaningful guidance and clarification as to how syllabus point 4 should be in-
terpreted.
Time will tell whether Chief Justice Benjamin's fears regarding this
landmark decision will come to fruition:
I also question how such a lessened self-defense standard,
which may be seen by some as condoning or even tacitly en-
couraging the use of self-help violence or vigilantism in a do-
mestic setting, can be seen as a positive advancement in our ef-
forts to reduce domestic violence. . . In the emotionally charged
environment which surrounds domestic violence, I further wor-
ry that the rational, objective definition which we may accord to
this new standard of 'self-defense' in the vacuum of an academ-
ic or legal setting will yield to an irrational, self-serving, and
narcissistic justification to a troubled mind to, in the spur of the
moment, 'right' some perceived domestic wrong and thereby
defend one's honor as much as one's self. In other words, in
the real world, the line between a legitimate and a non-
legitimate defense of one's self in a highly charged emotional
environment may get blurred-a situation which I fear may
work against victims of domestic violence as much as for
them.169
When one views the result of State v. Harden in the context of its facts,
Chief Justice Benjamin's fears and concerns seem entirely sensible. At no point
in time during the Harden's marriage-until the night of Danuel's death-had
Tanya been physically or sexually abused by her husband. Danuel's heavy
drinking led to the one "night of terror" wherein he physically and sexually as-
saulted Tanya. If Tanya's self-help actions, judged by the jury as not done in
true self-defense in light of the State's expert testimony, were ultimately ex-
cused and justified by the Court after only one night of domestic violence, won't
the women who have been subjected to years of domestic violence have all the
more reason to take "justice" (as they-not a court of law or a jury of their
peers-see it) into their own hands when there is no imminent danger?
While acknowledging that there are inadequacies to current methods of
domestic violence detection, prevention, treatment, education, and deterrence,
the solution to domestic violence should not be an implicit condoning by the
169 Id. at 648 (Benjamin, C.J., dissenting); see also Kaufman, supra note 20, at 369 ("If the
rules of self-defense permit an exception to this principle in the case of imminent danger, it is an
exception that is best kept to an absolute minimum. As Joshua Dressler cautions, 'we should hesi-
tate long and hard before we promote a criminal defence [sic] that categorically justifies the taking
of life before it is immediately necessary.' Before we proceed with any modification (let alone
elimination) of the imminence restriction, we had better consider very carefully the implications
of such a radical change in die long-established and highly effective principles controlling the
private resort to violence.") (citations omitted).
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West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of the abused taking matters into his
or her own hands at the most convenient time to permanently end the violence
by killing the abuser. Instead of a judicial unraveling of the delicate legal fabric
of self-defense, a better approach to addressing the serious domestic violence
problem in West Virginia would be through the legislative enactment of stiffer
laws and penalties, providing greater funding for and access to victims' rights
organizations, implementing more effective educational efforts and programs,
and beefing up law enforcement responses.
Regardless of whether one reacts to State v. Harden by applauding,
cringing or both, one thing is certain: criminal practitioners and judges must
take notice of this landmark case to know how to argue and apply the new law
to self-defense cases as best as they can.
Devin C. Daines*
B.S., Utah State University 2007; J.D. Candidate, West Virginia University College of Law,
2011. The author is forever grateful to his loving wife, Melanie, and his sweet daughter, Amy, for
their undying support, encouragement, and love throughout the law school journey. The author
also sincerely thanks his parents, Chris and Michelle Daines, who have sacrificed many hours to
offer invaluable legal and life advice. Lastly, the author thanks Travis Prince, the author's fellow
West Virginia College of Law classmate and good friend who clerked at the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals during the summer of 2009, for his helpful commentary and insights into
the case along the way.
[Vol. 1131000
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/9
